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Abstract
Current methodologies in machine learning an-
alyze the effects of various statistical parity no-
tions of fairness primarily in light of their im-
pacts on predictive accuracy and vendor utility
loss. In this paper, we propose a new frame-
work for interpreting the effects of fairness crite-
ria by converting the constrained loss minimiza-
tion problem into a social welfare maximization
problem. This translation moves a classifier and
its output into utility space where individuals,
groups, and society at-large experience differ-
ent welfare changes due to classification assign-
ments. Under this characterization, predictions
and fairness constraints are seen as shaping so-
cietal welfare and distribution and revealing in-
dividuals’ implied welfare weights in society—
weights that may then be interpreted through a
fairness lens. The social welfare formulation of
the fairness problem brings to the fore concerns
of distributive justice that have always had a cen-
tral albeit more implicit role in standard algorith-
mic fairness approaches.
1. Introduction
In his 1979 Tanner Lectures, Amartya Sen noted that since
nearly all theories of fairness are founded on an equal-
ity of some sort, the heart of the issue rests on clarifying
the “equality of what?” problem (1980). The field of
fair machine learning has not escaped this essential ques-
tion. Do such tools have an obligation to assure probabilis-
tic equality of outcomes (Feldman et al., 2015; Hardt et al.,
2016)? Or do they simply owe an equality of treatment
(Dwork et al., 2012)? Does fairness demand that individ-
uals (or groups) be subject to equal mistreatment rates
(Zafar et al., 2017; Bechavod & Ligett, 2017)? Or does be-
ing fair refer only to avoiding some intolerable level of
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discrimination? Differential demands of fairness contrast
starkly with each other in both their effects on the outcomes
that are ultimately issued and in the means by which they
may be implemented.
In machine learning, the task of accounting for fairness
involves comparing myriad metrics—probability distribu-
tions, error likelihoods, classification rates—sliced every
way possible to reveal the range of inequalities that may
arise before, during, and after the learning process. But as
shown in Chouldechova (2017) and Kleinberg et al. (2017),
fundamental statistical incompatibilities rule out any solu-
tion that satisfies all parity metrics, and we are left with the
harsh but unavoidable task of adjudicating between these
measures and methods. Past work has been limitedly able
to address these “inherent trade-offs.” For one, the lead-
ing approach of constrained loss minimization offers little
guidance by itself for choosing among the fairness desider-
ata, which appear incommensurable and result in different
impacts on different individuals and groups. Even when
comparisons are made across fairness metrics and methods,
current approaches refer only to losses in predictive accu-
racy or vendor utility as illustrative of the cost of assuring
different types of fairness. This methodology flattens mul-
tifaceted distributive procedures, which involve many in-
dividuals and thus many interests, into a two-dimensional
comparison of accuracy vs. “fairness,” and as a result fails
to capture the fundamentally social nature of fairness.
This paper proposes a conceptual framework and method-
ology for conceiving of fairness in machine learning that
is based in analysis of the society-wide distributional ef-
fects of classifier outputs. Our approach maps the stan-
dard empirical risk minimization task in supervised learn-
ing into a corresponding social welfare maximization task
as it appears in welfare economics’ Planner’s Problem. So-
cial welfare functionals are typically formulated as the sum
of weighted utility functions, where an individual’s weight
represents the value placed by society on her welfare. In-
verting the Planner’s Problem of efficient social welfare
maximization generates a question that is more concerned
with social equity: “Given a particular allocation, what is
the presumptive social weight function that would yield the
allocation as optimal?” Mapping a fair learning problem
into a social welfare problem lends new insight into the dif-
ferent fairness regimes proposed by admitting comparison
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of the distributive and welfare effects of the various mod-
els and constraints used in prediction. By centering social
welfare as the primary object of interest of fair machine
learning, we highlight a positive conception of fairness as
a societal good rather than as an oppositional force that de-
tracts from a decision-maker’s accuracy and optimality. We
believe that this perspective presents a more nuanced and
faithful understanding of fairness as a social ideal.
In this paper, we establish this mapping for the task of bi-
nary classification using linear SVMs. Starting with stan-
dard empirical risk minimization, we present general char-
acteristics of the structure of the implied welfare weight
function corresponding to a given learned classifier. We
then follow the two main distinct approaches to fairness-
adjusted classification, connecting the altered outcomes
and margins resulting from each of these new methodolo-
gies with shifting weight functions in the social welfare
problem. In offering two different perspectives on how the
welfare weight distribution may be transformed by fair ad-
justment, we present novel interpretations of how fairness
constraints alter boundary-based classifiers’ treatments of
individuals, groups, and the underlying feature space.
The deployment of socially-oriented machine learning in-
evitably implicates several ethical questions surrounding
the tension between shared societal norms and ideals and
a decision-maker’s private goals and interests. Most lead-
ing methodologies have focused on optimization of utility
or welfare to the vendor, limiting our ability to answer
questions about how individuals, groups, and society-at-
large fare under various distributive allocations. The so-
cial welfare perspective directly engages both questions
of efficiency, in the task of maximization, and equity, in
the design of welfare weights. This perspective is espe-
cially enlightening when applied to sectors in which the
government, acting as the Planner, maintains a strong in-
terest in issues of distributive fairness and can justifiably
make interpersonal comparisons of utility. Financial ser-
vices, wherein loan and credit approvals are increasingly
automated, satisfy both criteria and will be the main appli-
cation focus of this paper.
2. Problem Formalization
Before we formalize this paper’s objective of connecting
loss minimization with social welfare maximization, we
provide an overview of the separate perspectives on and
methodologies for achieving fairness in optimal predictions
or allocations. In this paper, we will center our analysis on
binary decision tasks using linear SVM classifiers.
Consider risk minimization within the supervised learn-
ing classification setting where the decision-maker seeks
the classifier that minimizes the probability of er-
ror on a training set of n data points D =
{xi, yi}
n
i . The risk-minimizing predictor is thus hˆθ :=
argminh∈H
∑n
i=1 ℓ(h(xi), yi) where H contains only
those classifiers that are linear halfspaces that may be writ-
ten as hθ(x) = θ
⊺
x + b with x, θ ∈ Rd and b ∈ R.
For binary classification, the ultimate classifications follow
yˆML(x) = sgn(hˆθ(x)). For our considered case of linear
SVMs, we will relax 0 − 1 loss and replace it with hinge
loss ℓh = max(0, 1− yihθ(xi)).
In the social welfare problem, a Planner is charged with
the task of maximizing societal welfare given as an ag-
gregate weighted sum of individuals’ utilities, W =∑n
i=1 wiui. The Planner distributing financial loans solves
ySWF (x) := argmaxyi
∑n
i=1 wiu(x
m
i , yi), where indi-
vidual i’s contribution to society’s overall welfare is a prod-
uct of her utility u(xmi , yi), a function of her income and
allocation outcome, and her societal weight wi. In binary
classification, the Planner can either allocate the good to in-
dividual i or not (yi ∈ {0, 1}), while in the standard welfare
problem, the Planner faces a fixed exogenous budget for al-
locations. In our formulation, the budget is set to be equal
to the number of positive instances issued by the classifier.
Our central question of interest in thus: For a given bound-
ary classifier hθ output by a loss minimization task and
a set of income levels xmi , can we characterize aspects
of the functional form of the welfare weights wi within
W =
∑n
i=1 wiu(x
m
i , yi) that would yield an optimal so-
cial allocation such that yˆSWF = yˆML? We call such an
allocation produced by a learned classifier that is also so-
cially optimal in the welfare sense a matched allocation.
2.1. Preliminary Results
A mapping from loss minimization to social welfare max-
imization requires that welfare weights be formulated to
“track” the classifier’s treatment of individuals. The Plan-
ner with a given classifier h(x) must prefer individual i
to j whenever h(xi) > h(xj); under matched alloca-
tions, equivalent margins enforce equivalent weights. The
Planner considers both classification margins h(xi) and
incomes xmi , and as such, weights must be a function
of both. Formally, the marginal social gain associated
with a positive classification y = 1, wf (h(x), x
m) =
w(h(x), xm)∆u(xm), where ∆u(xm) = u(xm, 1) −
u(xm, 0) represents the utility gain due to receiving a loan,
satisfies
dwf = ∆u[
∂w
∂h
dh+
∂w
∂xm
dxm] + w
d∆u
dxm
dxm > 0 (1)
whenever dh > 0 and dwf = 0 ⇔ dh = 0. From here,
characterizingwelfare weightsw depends on the functional
form of u(xm, y).
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3. Results
3.1. Unconstrained Loss Minimization
In the simplest case in which u(xm, y) is either linear or
additively separable, then d∆u
dxm
= 0, and Eq (1) reduces
to the condition that welfare weights w = f(h(x)) where
f is any positive monotonic transformation of h(x). Here,
weights do not depend on xm at all ( dw
dxm
= 0), and so long
as the welfare weights are such that
dwf
dh
= dw
dh
> 0, the
Planner is justified in distributing the matched allocation.
3.1.1. u(xm, y) CONCAVE IN xm
When utility exhibits the property of diminishing marginal
utility of income such that u(xm, y) is concave in xm, the
implied welfare weight function must now explicitly ac-
count for xm. In the binary allocation setting, the standard
statement of concavity, ∂
2u
(∂xm)2 < 0, becomes equivalent to
d∆u
dxm
< 0. Under this assumption of u, the welfare weight
condition in Eq. (1) may be expanded to
∂w
∂h
dh+
∂w
∂xm
dxm > |
w
∆u
d∆u
dxm
dxm| (2)
∂w
∂xm
dxm = |
w
∆u
d∆u
dxm
dxm| (3)
such that dh > 0 enforces a strictly greater lower bound
on dwf compared to the linear case, and changes in clas-
sification margin h must correspond to larger deviations
in w. Notice that when utility is linear or additively sep-
arable, two individuals i and j with identical classifica-
tion margins would be equally preferred under welfare
weights w(h(xi), x
m
i ) = w(h(xj), x
m
j ) and would receive
the matched allocation under the Planner’s Problem even if
they were endowed with differing income levels xmi > x
m
j .
In contrast, under concave u(xm, y), the condition that
∂w
∂h
dh > 0 is insufficient to achieve the appropriate welfare
weights. ∂w
∂xm
must also be increasing in the the concavity
of u(xm, y) as given in Eq. (3). As marginal utility returns
to income decrease, the Planner is only justified in allocat-
ing the loan to an individual with high xm if she inflates the
individual’s welfare weight in accordance with her income
to “offset” the loss due to concavity. These relations and
conditions of the weight function w(h(x), xm) in the Plan-
ner’s Problem are summarized in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Given classifier margins h(xi) and income
levels xmi , the following welfare maximization problem
ySWF = argmax
yi
n∑
i=1
w(h(xi), x
m
i )u(x
m
i , yi)
s.t
n∑
i=1
1{ySWF
i
>0} =
n∑
i=1
1{h(xi)>0},
yi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ [n]
with weights w(h(xi), x
m
i ) satisfying Eq. (2) and (3)
yields the matched optimal allocation ySWF = yML.
Moreover, the welfare weight function is of multiplicative
form w(h(x), xm) = f(h(x))g(xm) such that g(xm) =
k
∆u(xm) for some constant k ∈ R+.
Proof. Notice that the Planner can reduce her task to a
binary knapsack problem (BKP) by considering the max-
imization
∑n
i=1 w(h(xi), x
m
i )v(x
m
i , yi) where
v(xmi , yi) =
{
0, if yi = 0
∆u(xmi ), if yi = 1
When u(xm, y) is concave in xm, d∆u
dxm
< 0. The op-
timal solution to BKP may be attained via the greedy
algorithm in which the Planner allocates the good
yi = 1 in decreasing order starting with the indi-
vidual i with the highest marginal contribution to so-
cial welfare, w(h(xi), x
m
i )∆u(x
m
i ), until she depletes
her “budget”
∑n
i=1 1{h(xi)>0}. This procedure gener-
ates the same ordering on individuals as h(x) whenever
d(w(h(x),xm)∆u(xm))
dh
> 0, which is the inequality condi-
tion given in Eq. (2). When two individuals share the same
h(x), the greedy algorithm for BKP must also be indif-
ferent such that ∀xmi , x
m
j ≥ 0, marginal gains are equal:
w(h(xi), x
m
i )∆u(x
m
i ) = w(h(xj), x
m
j )∆u(x
m
j ), corre-
sponding to Eq. (3). Notice that generally wf (h(x), x
m)
cannot be a function of xm and as a result, the functional
form of w(h(x), xm) can be decomposed into functions
f(h(x)) and g(xm) = k∆u(xm) for some constant k ∈ R+.
The proof follows similarly when u(xm, y) is linear or ad-
ditively separable, and any weight function w(·) that pre-
serves the ordering given by h(x) yields the same BKP
solution. Since weights are defined up to a constant,
this result agrees with the multiplicative decomposition of
w(h(x), xm).
The multiplicative form of these underlying social wel-
fare weights highlights two intertwined effects of using
boundary-based classifiers in financial distribution deci-
sions. Concavity of utility enforces a term that explicitly
incorporates wealth as having a multiplicative impact on
welfare weights. Moreover, the wealth effect encoded in
g(xm) is compounded by the classifier score effect in f(h)
such that differences in individuals’ classification margins
also amplify differences in their incomes, and vice versa,
in determining an individual’s ultimate social weight. In
the binary classification task, intensified disparities in wel-
fare weight magnitudes do not affect the Planner’s optimal
allocation, but such differences do have significant reper-
cussions in more general welfare maximization settings in
which the Planner distributes allocations ySWFi ∈ R+.
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3.2. Fairness-constrained Loss Minimization
Having characterized aspects of the implied social welfare
weight functions under standard loss minimization, we now
move to “fair” formulations of learning and ask how popu-
lar parity-based constraints on optimization may be trans-
lated into social welfare space where they may be inter-
preted as redistributive mechanisms that act to shift welfare
weight among individuals and groups.
3.2.1. FAIR POST-PROCESSING
A post-processing approach to fairness proposed by Hardt
et al. adjusts the distribution of outcomes by using sensitive
attribute information to construct group-specific thresholds
for classification (2016). This approach grants flexibility to
practitioners who can apply the adjustment without need-
ing to access the original dataset or learn a new classifier.
Without a new classifier or new margins, welfare weights
explicitly incorporate group information to handle fairness
criteria. The welfare problem adopts the post-processing
approach of resolving fairness constraints by transforming
the original h0(x) margins by group-specific threshold fac-
tors to achieve various fairness parities. Since ∂w
∂h
dh >
0, then any positive affine transformation h′(x, z) =
T (h0(x); τ0, τz) applied group-wide, where τ0 and τz rep-
resent the old and new group-specific thresholds respec-
tively, that maps h0(x) = τ0 to new margin h
′(x, z) = τz
preserves ordering and interval scales. Then the optimal
allocation ySWF with weights w
(
T (h0(x); τ0, τz), x
m
)
will match the post-processed fair allocation yML.
3.2.2. LEARNING A FAIR CLASSIFIER
Recent efforts have incorporated fairness constraints into
the learning process itself by way of regularization
(Bechavod & Ligett, 2017) or convex proxies for con-
strained optimization (Zafar et al., 2017) to generate a new
classifier h′(x). We note that conditions for the implied
welfare weights under h′(x) may be rederived by direct ap-
peal to Theorem 3.1, but we also present in this section
an alternative procedure that although requiring the Plan-
ner to have access to richer information—she must know
both the previous and new classifiers, rather than just indi-
viduals’ margins—admits derivation of new conditions on
w′(·) from old conditions on w(·). This technique allows
direct comparison of the two functions w and w′ and thus
sheds light on how fairness constraints shift the distribution
of social welfare weight.
We derive conditions for dw′f (h
′(x), xm) in terms of
dwf (h(x), x
m) by constructing a transformation from the
old margins h(x) to the new margins h′(x). Let T :
hx 7→ h
′
x
be the linear transformation that maps the or-
thogonal projection of x onto h to its orthogonal pro-
jection onto h′. Formally, we have hx = Phx ∈
R
d where Ph ∈ R
d×d gives the orthogonal projec-
tion mapping of x onto h. Then following Eq. (2)
with wf (h
′(x), xm) = w
(
D(x, T (h(x))), xm
)
∆u(xm),
whereD(x, T (hx)) gives the Euclidean distance from x to
its projection on h′ = T (hx), we have that
∂w(·)
∂D(·)
dD(·) +
∂w(·)
∂xm
dxm > |
w(·)
∆u
d∆u
dxm
dxm| (4)
where D(·) = D(x, T (hx)) and w(·) = w
(
D(·), xm
)
.
The total differential dD(·) is computed as
(
√
‖(x− T (Ph(x)))‖2)
−1
[ d∑
i=1
[
xi −
d∑
j=1
Tij
(
(Ph)j · x
)]
dxi+
[( d∑
j=1
(
Tij((Ph)j · x))− xi
)( d∑
k=1
Tik
(
(Ph)k · dx
))]]
(5)
Since Ph, Ph′ and T are unique for boundary classifiers
h(x) and h′(x), and the Euclidean distance D(x, T (hx))
is easily computable, all of the new variables and functions
in Eq. (5) can be analytically derived. Since
∂w(·)
∂D(·) =
∂w
∂h
,
the multiplicative factor given by dD(·) dictates how the
new welfare weights w′(h′(x), xm) shift. In particular, the
inclusion of vector rows Ti of the matrix T offers a geomet-
ric interpretation of the new classifier’s transformation of
the feature space. Thus, working from the previous weight
function w(h(x), xm) corresponding to the original unfair
classifier h and ensuring that Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) holds, the
new weights w′(h′(x), xm) will justify the fair matched al-
location ySWF = yML under social welfare maximization.
4. Discussion
Within the financial services sector, both disparate impact
and accuracy loss may be understood in terms of utility
gains and losses incurred by different agents. By con-
necting loss minimization of accuracy to social welfare
maximization, we make such trade-offs explicit and in do-
ing so, broaden the scope of the fairness question to in-
clude distributive justice. This descriptive mathematical
link sets the groundwork for the requisite normative reason-
ing of fair machine learning. Different loss functions, par-
ity constraints, and fairness-adjustment methodologies all
differentially impact “optimal” classifier behavior. Trans-
lating these various effects into changes in welfare weights,
which may be analyzed at the individual level or summed
to reveal group shares of societal welfare, allows practition-
ers to better interpret and evaluate the distributive impacts
of predictions and as a result, make more informed compar-
isons among these choices when building models.
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This work presents preliminary results on the mapping
from boundary-based classification to social welfare maxi-
mization, but it is our hope that future work will establish a
bidirectional relationship such that insights in welfare max-
imization may be translated for fair classification. Welfare
economics as a field has a rich history of developing princi-
ples and methods of analysis centered on problems of fair
representation and distribution. Linking the field with ma-
chine learning would yield complementary perspectives on
fairness that would be both normative and descriptive, the-
oretical and implementable.
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